Measuring and visualizing cyber threat intelligence quality by Schlette, Daniel et al.
International Journal of Information Security
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10207-020-00490-y
REGULAR CONTRIBUT ION
Measuring and visualizing cyber threat intelligence quality
Daniel Schlette1 · Fabian Böhm1 ·Marco Caselli2 · Günther Pernul1
© The Author(s) 2020
Abstract
The very raison d’être of cyber threat intelligence (CTI) is to provide meaningful knowledge about cyber security threats.
The exchange and collaborative generation of CTI by the means of sharing platforms has proven to be an important aspect of
practical application. It is evident to infer that inaccurate, incomplete, or outdated threat intelligence is a major problem as only
high-quality CTI can be helpful to detect and defend against cyber attacks. Additionally, while the amount of available CTI is
increasing it is not warranted that quality remains unaffected. In conjunction with the increasing number of available CTI, it is
thus in the best interest of every stakeholder to be aware of the quality of a CTI artifact. This allows for informed decisions and
permits detailed analyses. Our work makes a twofold contribution to the challenge of assessing threat intelligence quality. We
first propose a series of relevant quality dimensions and configure metrics to assess the respective dimensions in the context of
CTI. In a second step, we showcase the extension of an existing CTI analysis tool to make the quality assessment transparent
to security analysts. Furthermore, analysts’ subjective perceptions are, where necessary, included in the quality assessment
concept.
Keywords Cyber threat intelligence · Threat intelligence sharing · Data quality · Threat intelligence formats · Information
security visualization
1 Introduction
The last years have seen the emergence of sharing informa-
tion about threats, cyber attacks, and incidents by organi-
zations. The urge to join forces in the fight against cyber
criminals originates from an ever-increasing number of
attacks and the related risks for organizations [1,2]. Not only
the number but also the complexity of attacks has increased
over the years resulting in successful intrusions with more
severe forms of security breaches. For individual organiza-
tions, it is an almost impossible task to detect these complex
and decentralized attacks on their own. Thus, organizations
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share their available information about incidents and attacks.
This information is referred to as cyber threat intelligence
(CTI).
However, investigations show that inaccurate, incomplete,
or outdated threat intelligence is an important challenge for
collaborating organizations [3,4]. More recently, empirical
studies with domain experts emphasize that ensuring CTI
quality throughout the collaboration process is crucial for
its continuing success [5,6]. The exchange and utilization
of meaningful threat intelligence depends on measuring and
ensuring its quality. This necessity is strengthened as the
quality of shared information is stated to have an impact on
the required time to respond to an incident [7].
Additionally, it is important to inform stakeholders about
the quality of individual CTI artifacts [5]. This can help
analysts to narrow down available information to the intelli-
gence actually requiring their attention. Therefore, analysts
can come to better informed decisions how to react to inci-
dents reported within the CTI. The other way around, the
domain knowledge of security analysts is a very promising
source for the “fitness for use” [8] of a CTI artifact. Includ-
ing experts into the process of measuring quality of threat
intelligence is a starting point to assess contextually depen-
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dent data quality (DQ) dimensions. To leverage the domain
knowledge of experts, it is necessary to make the data quality
assessment transparent to them. In a further step, users should
be allowed to contribute their own perception of threat intel-
ligence quality which increases the trust into both platform
and threat intelligence [9].
This work centers on two aspects making a contribution to
measuring cyber threat intelligence quality. We present a first
approach to assess relevant quality dimensions of a standard-
ized CTI data format. For this purpose, we first derive relevant
DQ dimensions for CTI and define metrics which allow to
measure these dimensions. The metrics are then configured
to the STIX format as they rely on its structure. We further
differentiate metrics which can be calculated automatically
and metrics where input of domain experts is needed. There-
upon, we extend our previously proposed open-source CTI
analysis tool to convey CTI data quality to security analysts.
The extension helps to provide an indication about the quality
of the CTI artifact at hand. Our extension also demonstrates
how security analysts can contribute to CTI quality assess-
ment through an interactive visualization.
The remainder of this work is structured as follows: Sect. 2
gives an overview of related work in the field of cyber threat
intelligence data quality. A brief introduction to the STIX 2
format can be found in Sect. 3. This section additionally pro-
vides an example to illustrate the format, the concept of CTI
sharing, and related quality issues. In Sect. 4, we select and
structure relevant DQ dimensions. Metrics for the assessment
of these dimensions in the context of the specific format are
configured in Sect. 5. In Sect. 6, we propose an extension of
the STIX format for CTI quality and a possible approach to
communicate this quality to users of a CTI analysis tool. This
section also describes interviews we conducted with security
experts to gain feedback on the proposed approach. Our arti-
cle concludes in Sect. 7 with a short summary and possible
future research directions.
2 Related work
Although CTI and especially quality of CTI are not yet exten-
sively researched topics in the information security field,
some related work has already been conducted. We give a
short overview of this work hereinafter.
Dandurand and Serrano [10] are among the first to define
requirements for a CTI sharing platform. The requirements
for such a platform include some form of quality assurance
and the provision of adjustable quality control processes.
The authors, however, do not specify quality dimensions or
metrics to assess the quality of the CTI in their proposed
infrastructure.
In 2014, Serrano et al. [11] point out that there is missing
support for quality control and management in existing CTI
sharing platforms. The authors propose that organizations
should install quality control processes to provide multiple
measurable quality values. Although the need for quality
assessment is discussed, it is not described how such an
assessment could be implemented into a platform.
Sillaber et al. [5] perform a series of focus group inter-
views and discussions with threat intelligence experts. They
derive a number of findings on how data quality dimen-
sions influence threat intelligence. They do not identify
fundamentally new data quality issues specific to the CTI
area. However, the authors give several recommendations for
future research and for possibly relevant data quality dimen-
sions. This work does not propose an explicit approach to
measure DQ in the CTI context but rather stays on a generic
level.
In their survey investigating threat intelligence, Tounsi et
al. [7] specifically call for methods to evaluate the qual-
ity of threat intelligence. This also applies to the wider
organizational security operations center (SOC) context as
low-quality CTI is identified to be a pivotal issue [12]. To
the best of our knowledge, there is no respective academic
work addressing these open issues. Furthermore, none of the
currently available commercial threat intelligence sharing
platforms is actively measuring CTI quality [7]. With this
work, we aim to take a first step into this direction.
3 Structured threat information expression
(STIX)
First, this section gives a brief overview of the STIX format.
This is necessary as following sections rely on a fundamental
understanding of format specifics. The second part introduces
a motivational example which is intended to illustrate the
STIX format and basic processes of a CTI sharing platform.
This example highlights the importance of evaluating CTI
quality in the context of a centralized sharing platform with
multiple participants.
3.1 STIX format
We base our approach to assess CTI quality on the STIX 2
data format defined and maintained by the OASIS consor-
tium.1 According to recent analyses, STIX is the de facto
standard used for CTI [13,14]. The successor of this format
is called STIX 2. It is likely that STIX 2 will reach a sim-
ilar popularity throughout the next years as it is the format
with the most extensive application scenarios [14]. There-
fore, our quality assessment is built upon this promising
format. Whenever the term “STIX” is used in the remain-
der of this work, we actually refer to STIX 2.
1 https://oasis-open.github.io/cti-documentation/.
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STIX is a machine-readable, semi-structured format based
on JavaScript Object Notation (JSON)2 to structure and
exchange cyber threat intelligence. The format provides two
main object types:
1. STIX Domain Objects (SDOs) describing characteristics
of an incident and
2. STIX Relationship Objects (SROs) describing the rela-
tionships between those characteristics.
SDOs and SROs contain a number of common attributes
which are part of any STIX object and additional attributes
specific to the respective object type. Common attributes are
IDs or the type of the object, whereas exemplary-specific
attributes are the motivation of an attacker or the version
identifier of a tool.
The current specification of the format conveys twelve
SDO types [15]. These allow to provide a holistic view of
a cyber incident including both high-level attribution intel-
ligence (e.g., the associated attack campaign or the threat
actor) and low-level information (e.g., the data indicating
the attack and exploited vulnerabilities).
There are two types of SROs. The first SRO type allows
to connect any two SDOs with an explicit relationship high-
lighting e.g., the vulnerability exploited by a malware. Both
can be modeled as SDOs, whereas the logical connection
between them is expressed by an SRO. The second SRO type
denotes that a specific SDO has been identified. It connects
this SDO with an SRO describing the evidential data for this
assumption.
SDOs and SROs relevant for a specific threat or incident
can be encapsulated by a report. The SDO for this purpose is
the Report object which references all, respectively, relevant
SDOs and SROs.
3.2 Motivational example
In this section, we describe a fictional CTI sharing platform
which is used by critical infrastructure providers (e.g., hos-
pitals, energy operators, etc.) to exchange threat intelligence
artifacts. Although the platform and the providers in our
example are fictional, there is a number of real-world shar-
ing platforms comparable to the described one. The specific
characteristics and operation modes of the platform are not
relevant to our example which is why we chose a fictional
setting. The main goal of the following explanations is to
describe the central idea and necessary processes of a CTI
sharing platform.
Starting the example depicted in Fig. 1, we can think of
a power plant operating a state-of-the-art security operations
center (SOC). At some point in time, the alerting mechanisms
2 https://www.json.org/.
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Fig. 1 Simplified CTI Exchange Platform structure
of the plant’s intrusion detection systems (IDS) indicate an
ongoing attack affecting various critical systems. Automated
systems start the collection of related information through
log file and network traffic analyses. Immediately, security
experts start their analysis to protect the plant’s cyber systems
and to gain as much insight into the attack as possible.
The outcome of automated and manual analyses in the
form of collected, attack-related data casts a light on what
seems to be an unknown APT. Various machines of the power
plant have been compromised and connected to several con-
trol units outside of the internal network. The related IP
addresses as well as configuration files have been identified.
Additionally, the attackers exploited known but unpatched
vulnerabilities of a web server and a specific version of an
operating system to spread their attack. This allowed them
to conduct lateral movement in the organization’s network
without being noticed. To defend the network and remove
the malware, security analysts applied appropriate counter-
measures.
Part of the power plant’s SOC is the active participation
on a CTI sharing platform. On this platform, several oper-
ators of critical infrastructure collaborate to improve their
cyber defense. Most of these collaborative efforts are based
on exchanging intelligence about previously unknown threats
or by sharing new insights about existing incidents. There are
different roles of participants active on the platform: Publish-
ers post CTI artifacts on the platform, whereas consumers
process these artifacts. However, participants of a sharing
platform usually hold both these roles simultaneously.
As the power plant’s analysts did detect a new type of
attack, they transform the gained insights into a STIX report
which is published on the sharing platform. The CTI contains
the identified threat actor, exploited vulnerabilities, and the
deployed malware. Additionally, the analysts include indica-
tors of compromise (file hashes, IP addresses, and the like) to
help other participants to detect this attack. They also share
the applied countermeasures.
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A simplified example of the STIX artifact shared by the
power plant is shown in Listing 1. Please note that some
aspects of the example are not fully aligned with the cur-
rent STIX specification due to readability reasons.3 However,
the example allows to gain a better understanding of STIX.
The shared CTI contains the identified Threat Actor, the
deployed Malware, the exploited Vulnerability, and an Indi-
cator referring to the respective malware file. Additionally,
the Relationships between these entities are shown. For
example, these relationships point out that the Threat Actor
uses the Malware to target a Vulnerability.
Another user of the CTI sharing platform might be the
operator of a hospital. The operator is leveraging the knowl-
edge made available on the platform to improve the hospital’s
resilience to cyber attacks. Therefore, published indicators
of attacks from the platform are automatically fed into the
operator’s intrusion detection systems. Additionally, secu-
rity experts of the operator carry out manual analyses on the
most relevant CTI artifacts to identify possible threats. The
manual analysis of the artifacts is performed through a visual
interface as the CTI format used by the platform is not easily
readable for humans.
{
‘‘type ’’: ‘‘threat -actor ’’,
‘‘id ’’: ‘‘threat -actor --1’’,
‘‘created ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘modified ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘name ’’: ‘‘Adversary Bravo ’’,
‘‘description ’’: ‘‘Is known to
manipulate critical
infrastructures , I suppose ’’,
‘‘labels ’’: [ ‘‘spy ’’, ‘‘criminal ’’ ]
},{
‘‘type ’’: ‘‘malware ’’,
‘‘id ’’: ‘‘malware --1’’,
‘‘created ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14z
’’,
‘‘modified ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘name ’’: ‘‘Malware d1c6 ’’,
},{
‘‘type ’’: ‘‘vulnerability ’’,
‘‘id ’’: ‘‘vulnerability --1’’,
‘‘created ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14z
’’,
‘‘modified ’’: ‘‘2019-03-07T14 :22:14z
’’,
‘‘name ’’: ‘‘A Webserver Vulnerability
’’
},{
‘‘type ’’: ‘‘indicator ’’,
‘‘id ’’: ‘‘indicator --1’’
‘‘created ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
3 Object IDs are not in UUIDv4 format, and some mandatory schema
structures are left out.
‘‘modified ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘labels ’’: [‘‘malicious -activity ’’],
‘‘pattern ’’: ‘‘[ file:hashes.’SHA
-256’ =
’4bac27393bdd9777ce02453256c5577c
d02275510b2227f473d03f533924f877
’]’’,
‘‘valid_from ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14
Z’’
},{
‘‘type ’’: ‘‘relationship ’’,
‘‘id ’’: ‘‘relationship --1’’,
‘‘created ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘modified ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘source_ref ’’: ‘‘threat -actor --1’’,
‘‘target_ref ’’: ‘‘malware --1’’,
‘‘relationship_type ’’: ‘‘uses ’’
},{
‘‘type ’’: ‘‘relationship ’’,
‘‘id ’’: ‘‘relationship --2’’,
‘‘created ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘modified ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘source_ref ’’: ‘‘indicator --1’’,
‘‘target_ref ’’: ‘‘malware --1’’,
‘‘relationship_type ’’: ‘‘indicates ’’
},{
‘‘type ’’: ‘‘relationship ’’,
‘‘id ’’: ‘‘relationship --3’’,
‘‘created ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘modified ’’: ‘‘2019-04-07T14 :22:14Z
’’,
‘‘source_ref ’’: ‘‘malware --1’’,
‘‘target_ref ’’: ‘‘vulnerability --2’’,
‘‘relationship_type ’’: ‘‘targets ’’
}
Listing 1 Exemplary STIX 2 artifact
The power plant’s CTI artifact is analyzed by the hospital’s
security personnel only a few months after the respective
incident. This is mainly because vast amounts of available
CTI hinder the security experts to identify threat intelligence
relevant for them. During the analysis of the artifact published
by the power plant, the responsible security analyst of the
hospital spots that the respective attack targets a software in
use by the hospital as well. Subsequent network and endpoint
analyses indicate that the hospital has been affected although
the IDS seems to have not noticed the compromise as the
binaries of the malware have changed in the meantime. In
addition, although the same software is in use, the version
number proclaimed to be exploited at the power plant seems
to be invalid.
During the analysis of the incident at the hospital, analysts
come across some changes and additional insights into the
attack. Additionally, the proposed countermeasures are not
sufficient to get rid of the attacker. Therefore, an updated ver-
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Fig. 2 Process steps of DQ methodologies [16]
sion of the CTI artifact is published to the platform to ensure
each participant is informed about the advanced version of the
cyber attack. However, during this process the information
about the threat actor is unintentionally duplicated leading to
redundant information.
The example above shows that the timely exchange
of high-quality CTI is crucial for the effort of organiza-
tions to prevent cyber security breaches. However, there
are numerous pitfalls regarding the quality of the shared
threat intelligence. Examples from the above-described use
case are: 1) inaccurate information caused by input errors
made during the documentation of an attack (invalid version
of exploited software), 2) outdated information caused by
delays in CTI propagation (changed binaries of malware), or
3) duplicated information caused by collaboration (redundant
description of threat actor). Even the overload of CTI avail-
able to human analysts and their incapability to determine
the most relevant CTI can be seen as a data quality problem.
Each of these examples stresses the urge to measure CTI
quality and to visualize the results for human analysts.
4 Approach for CTI quality assessment
General DQ methodologies consist of three main process
steps depicted in Fig. 2. Initially, the collection of necessary
data is performed. Data sources and involved costs are fun-
damental building blocks for the following process steps.
The second step includes the identification and measure-
ment of relevant quality dimensions in the context where
the methodology is applied. After quantifying data quality,
the last process step strives to improve the quality following
a fixed set of techniques and strategies. Although there is
no cohesive methodology for information quality manage-
ment of CTI yet, this work solely focuses on measuring DQ
in the context of CTI as highlighted in Fig. 2. Up to now,
existing work has mostly provided general advice for mainly
the first and the last methodology step but has not described
approaches to actually measure CTI quality [5,13,17]. We
put explicit focus on the quality assessment. We thus assume
the existence and availability of the necessary data for assess-
ment.
Our work on selecting and structuring DQ dimensions
relevant for CTI is the result of an iterative process in which
we actively sought input and feedback from a number of
CTI researchers and practitioners, e.g., domain experts from
computer emergency response teams (CERTs). Throughout
multiple evaluation iterations the relevant dimensions and
their structure as described in the following two subsec-
tions were consequently adapted according to the input of
the experts.
4.1 Selecting relevant DQ dimensions for CTI
Before introducing measurements for CTI quality, relevant
DQ dimensions have to be selected. Extant work has already
suggested a wide variety of different DQ dimensions refer-
ring to either the data values or the data schema [18]. The
literature distinguishes three main approaches for propos-
ing general and abstract quality dimensions: the theoretical
approach [19], the empirical approach [20], and the intuitive
approach [21].
Considering the different approaches and various DQ
dimensions, it is not an easy task to select relevant and
applicable dimensions for a problem at hand. Following
the empirical approach by Wang and Strong [20], related
research such as the work of Sillaber et al. [5], Sauerwein et
al. [13], or Umbrich et al. [22] identify a first set of relevant
dimensions which is refined throughout this work.
Our resulting set of dimensions is shown in Fig. 3. An
interesting finding yielding from the discussion with the CTI
experts is the high complexity of the Appropriate amount
of data quality dimension. This dimension is meant to help
experts to decide whether a CTI artifact by any chance could
contain helpful information. In general, this decision can
only be made by comparing the real-world artifact with its
CTI description. However, this is rarely possible. Therefore,
another approach is needed to give security analysts an indi-
cation for this dimension. Throughout our discussions, it
turned out that experts are often basing their decision on
the diversity of SDO types and their interconnection in a
STIX report. Arguably, homogeneous SDO types and few
relationships between them lead to experts’ perception that
the report does not describe the real-world incident properly.
For the in-depth examination of the Appropriate amount of
data quality dimension we refer to Sect. 5.3.
4.2 Structuring DQ dimensions for CTI
Our goal for DQ assessment in the context of CTI is to come
up with measures to quantify the selected dimensions and
aggregate them into a combined score for a STIX report. We
therefore structure the dimensions in three different levels
depending on the input data as shown in Fig. 3. The assess-
ment of the dimensions on the “Attribute Level” operates on
specific attributes of STIX objects, e.g., the dimension of
Timeliness can be assessed using the modified- and created-
attributes of STIX objects. The two dimensions located on the
“Object Level” in Fig. 3 are not bound to predefined attributes
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Fig. 3 Schematic of the structure of DQ dimensions
of the objects. In fact, they can be measured based on either
varying attribute sets (Representational Consistency) or the
object as a whole (Reputation). At the highest level (“Report
Level”), we propose a final dimension to cope with experts’
requirement to be informed about whether a report is likely
to contain an Appropriate amount of data as described in the
paragraph above.
Individual scores on both attribute and object level are
then aggregated to a combined object quality indicator. This
aggregation provides a quick and helpful insight for any user
navigating through cyber threat information. Artifacts with
a high-quality score are probably the ones to analyze first.
Additionally, on a “Report Level” this aggregation allows
to inform users about the average object quality in a given
report. This is accompanied by an indication whether the
report contains an appropriate amount of data. However,
as DQ dimensions can be of varying importance for dif-
ferent users the aggregation has to be customizable [11].
Adjustable aggregation parameters enable CTI users to define
the weight of each DQ dimensions in the procedure of
calculating a quality indication for each STIX object. The
corresponding metrics for aggregation are further outlined in
Sect. 5.4.
Additionally, to these various levels for the DQ dimen-
sions, we differentiate objective and subjective dimensions
which are also indicated in Fig. 3. DQ has to be evaluated
with objective measurements as well as from subjective per-
ception [16,23,24]. Objective measurements rely on math-
ematical and quantitative measures to evaluate an artifact’s
quality. However, some dimensions of DQ are dependent on
their contextual environment. It is thus necessary to incorpo-
rate the requirements, experience, and knowledge of domain
experts. When it comes to the decision whether data is of
high quality regarding a specific use case or context, objec-
tive DQ dimensions fail to provide reasonable quality scores
[25]. At this point, it is necessary to incorporate subjective
measures as a supporting concept. Here, the assessment of
an artifact’s quality is based on qualitative evaluation by data
administrators and other experts.
In the context of a CTI sharing platform, the concept of
subjective perception and domain knowledge to evaluate var-
ious DQ dimensions equally applies. While domain knowl-
edge is a necessary input for subjective quality dimensions,
it also supports assessment of objective DQ dimensions. The
domain knowledge can be captured through a system similar
to a reputation system where users provide their perception
about the quality of an object or report [26]. The need for a
reputation system to include subjective quality perceptions
and to increase trust is also highlighted in empirical studies
[5]. Subjective quality assessment in the CTI sharing con-
text can originate from different stakeholders of a respective
platform: On the one hand, consumers (security experts, ana-
lysts, etc.) contribute with their domain knowledge and their
organization-specific background; on the other hand, a plat-
form host can act as a trusted third party contributing to the
quality assessment.
Overall, these three levels provide good and transparent
indicators for the quality of a STIX-based cyber threat intel-
ligence artifact. For indication of individual DQ dimensions,
we adopt and extend existing naming conventions [20].
5 Measuring CTI quality
In this section, we elaborate on suitable DQ dimensions as
the result of our studies. For each dimension, its applicability
to the CTI context is described and respective metrics for
assessment are configured. Those assessments are either of
an objective or a subjective nature depending on whether they
can be automated or need manual input. Subjective metrics
are based on the perceptions and expressions of a CTI sharing
platform’s participants. Furthermore, there is a number of
objective dimensions which benefit from additional manual
input of domain experts. The ordering of the metrics follows
the previously outlined structure of the dimensions in Sect.
4.2.
The proposed metrics in the following are again the result
of an iterative process collaborating with CTI researchers and
practitioners. Several metric configurations result from long
discussions with domain experts where a lot of very valuable
feedback was provided highlighting possible configurations
to assess CTI quality.
Configurations for the metrics are based on the formal
ground truth defined in Eqs. 1–5. We formally define two
different attribute sets of STIX as Ar (i.e., Eq. 1) and Ao
(i.e., Eq. 2). Required attributes ar , for example, are unique
IDs, names, labels, and types which are present in most STIX
objects. As for optional attributes ao, characteristics such as
descriptions, versions, and external references are referred
to Eq. 3 which defines any STIX Domain Object or STIX
Relationship Object as a specific subset of both the available
required and optional attributes. This subsequently allows us
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to describe the objects O held by a CTI sharing platform as
a set of objects where each object o is either a SDO or SRO
(i.e., Eq. 4). STIX objects such as Threat Actor, Malware, or
Indicator belong to the set of SDOs, while Relationship and
Sighting objects are SROs. When an incident or an attack is
reported to the platform, the resulting report r is defined by
Eq. 5 to be a subset of all objects persisted in the platform.
Ar = {ar | ar required in STIX 2} (1)
Ao = {ao | ao optional in STIX 2} (2)
SDO, S RO ⊆ (Ar ∪ Ao) (3)
O = {o | o ∈ (SDO ∪ S RO)} (4)
R = {r ⊆ O} (5)
5.1 Attribute level
This subsection defines the DQ dimensions we consider to
be assessed at the attribute level, meaning that they rely on a
subset of a STIX object’s attributes.
Concise representation Concise representation addresses
expressiveness of CTI and redundancies within the data [20].
Intensional and extensional are two distinct forms of con-
ciseness. While the former is centered on the uniqueness
of attributes and the schema level, the later emphasizes on
unique objects. In the motivational example, the duplication
of the information about the attacker links to the concise rep-
resentation dimension as DQ is affected. It is worth noting
that in the extant literature, concise representation sometimes
only refers to compactly represented information [18]. In the
context of STIX, the specification provides clear guidance
how to implement a concise representation. It is explicitly
stated that a unique identifier is assigned to each artifact.
Additionally, each STIX object adheres to a specified JSON
schema, and thus, optional and mandatory attributes are pre-
defined. In general, the assumption holds that intensional
conciseness is warranted through the schema definition. One
exception in STIX is based on specifics of several STIX
objects4 as they contain lists referencing other objects. These
lists are prone to redundant inputs, especially when defined
manually.
With regard to extensional conciseness, the information
within a CTI platform must be assessed for its respective
quality. The main reason for this is that with a growing num-
ber of CTI producers, the probability of duplicated objects
within the platform becomes likely. More precisely, there
is a high chance that two or more objects on the platform
are semantic duplicates. Even considering one single STIX
report, semantically unique objects are not guaranteed as
more than one person could work on the documentation
4 Examples are the Report object as well as the Sighting object.
of the incident and already existing information might be
overlooked. Especially, when taking a look at the numerous
free-text description fields defined in the current STIX spec-
ification, an indication whether these descriptions contain
redundant information is important. However, comparing
text for semantic redundancy is not an easy task. We encour-
age the application of methods for semantic similarity. The
Simhash algorithm is one example proposed to approach
this problem [27]. It allows for comparing two STIX objects
regarding their uniqueness. An object o1 is considered unique
in a set of objects O if its similari t y to any other object
o2 ∈ O is below a threshold t (see Eq. 6).
Objective metrics alone are not sufficient to assess con-
cise representation in practical use. It is inevitable to include
subjective perceptions through the utilization of domain
knowledge. In this case, platform users conduct or support
quality assessment and contribute by pointing out redundan-
cies.
C R(o) =
{
1 if similari t y(o1, o2) < t
0 else (6)
Objectivity CTI is oftentimes created by multiple human
actors during the analysis of an attack. These human CTI
creators contribute not only objective threat information but
might also introduce emotional or subjective perceptions.
Most of the resulting descriptions are phrased in natural lan-
guage. This is also the case in the motivational example in
Sect. 3.2 and the threat actor description. There, the words
“I suppose” indicate subjectivity and the context-depended
observations of the security analyst. However, objectivity is a
desirable characteristic of shared CTI artifacts as only objec-
tive information can be helpful for others. Natural language
processing and sentiment analysis, therefore, can facilitate
the assessment of unbiased and impartial CTI information as
part of the objectivity DQ dimension.
Subjective descriptions of CTI information can be identi-
fied through the use of various subjectivity detection methods
[28]. In the context of CTI and with regard to STIX, spe-
cial focus is on attributes with free-text description fields in
contrast to predefined enumerations and open vocabularies.
This ultimately leads toward a sentence-level orientation for
subjectivity detection as these fields contain only a limited
number of words. Subjectivity detection methods in general
can follow a syntactical approach or center on semantics. A
thorough investigation into specifics of such methods must
be considered during implementation to determine the best-
fitting approach. Regardless of implementation, we classify
relevant attribute values v(a) of STIX objects into two dis-
tinct categories objective and subjective as shown in Eq. 7.
Underlying this classification is the application of a suitable
sentiment algorithm which yields a score for either objectiv-
ity or subjectivity. The results of the classification for chosen
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attribute values are then aggregated to provide an objectivity
metric for each object o based on Eq. 8.
O B(a) =
{
1 if v(a) classified as objective
0 if v(a) classified as subjective (7)
O B(o) =
∑
a∈o O B(a)
|o ∩ (Ar ∪ Ao)| (8)
Relevancy Relevancy forms a DQ dimension incorporating
a user’s perspective by comparing sets of property values
to assess the usefulness of a CTI artifact for the consumer.
This is an important aspect of CTI’s fitness for use regard-
ing an individual organization or analyst. For example, CTI
describing an incident targeted at a specific industry sector
is likely to be less relevant for other industry sectors. Also,
security analysts might not be interested in threats targeting
technologies not deployed in their organization. To illustrate
this, the motivational example hints at the exploitation of vul-
nerabilities in software used at both the power plant and the
hospital. Information about the relevance can be very helpful
for analysts when prioritizing CTI artifacts to be analyzed.
Contextual information about the user can either be col-
lected by the platform host or can be found in STIX objects
describing the user. Specific characteristics (e.g., the indus-
try sector) of a CTI publisher and those of a consumer are
assessed for matches. In addition, attribute values for avail-
able STIX objects—for example, the Vulnerability—can be
compared with the user’s characteristics (e.g., the applied
technologies), too. The coverage ratio expressed in Eq. 9
indicates relevance by taking the sets of all property values
for consumer PVc, publisher PVp and relevant STIX objects
PVo into consideration. Congruent property values are set in
relation to the total number of property values available for
comparison.
The metric for the DQ dimension of relevancy could be
further extended by inclusion of information contained in
STIX Sighting objects. These objects incorporate a number
describing how many times the referenced object has been
identified. Therefore, this fosters the assessment of relevancy
as frequently seen objects (e.g., an Malware object) might
indicate a high relevance of these objects. This assumption
can be expressed in a weighting factor added to the general
metric and thus improve DQ assessment.
RE(o) = |PVc ∩ (PVp ∪ PVo)||PVp ∪ PVo| (9)
Schema completeness The general completeness of data is
confined to the assessment of schema completeness in the
context of CTI. To distinguish this data quality dimension
from syntactic accuracy, we focus on optional attributes and
their values as the STIX JSON schemes already allow to
assess the existence of required attributes. This aspect is cov-
ered by the DQ dimension of syntactic accuracy later on.
STIX-based threat intelligence can be assessed for schema
completeness of individual optional attributes ao. A miss-
ing optional attribute value v(ao) is identified and classified
according to Eq. 10. A strict distinction between com-
plete (i.e., with value) and incomplete (i.e., without value)
attributes is enforced. Referring to the example in Sect. 3.2,
the vulnerability could be described in more detail with an
external reference to a specific Common Vulnerabilities and
Exposures (CVE) entry. This optional information would
help others to gain further information about the actual vul-
nerability, how it is exploited, and how it can be fixed. This
would ultimately improve CTI quality significantly by mak-
ing it easier for others to leverage the CTI. In a second step,
schema completeness for an entire STIX object o builds upon
the previously calculated completeness scores for included
attributes. The ratio of filled optional attributes to the total
number of optional attributes of an object represents the
schema completeness metric as shown in Eq. 11.
SC(ao) =
{
1 if v(ao) = NU L L
0 else (10)
SC(o) =
∑
ao∈(o∩Ao) SC(ao)
|o ∩ Ao| (11)
Syntactic accuracy The data quality dimension of accuracy
contributes to the correctness of data. With focus on syntactic
accuracy in the context of CTI, the data schema is of partic-
ular importance for quality assessment. Syntactic accuracy
gives a first indication on the extend to which an object is
aligned with its data format.
The OASIS consortium behind the STIX format provides
a JSON schema for each object. This allows for an automated
matching of objects against those schemes to assess syntactic
accuracy. In general, this DQ dimension is measured based on
the analysis of attribute values v(a) with a ∈ (Ar ∪ Ao) being
part of a domain D [16]. In application to STIX-based threat
intelligence, we can use the existing JSON schemes and val-
idate each attribute value against the schema definition. The
domain D is derived from the JSON schema which provides
data types and allowed values. The assessment for syntactic
accuracy of each attribute value is expressed by Eq. 12. An
overarching indicator for syntactic accuracy of an object o
can, respectively, be calculated as shown in Eq. 13.
S A(a) =
{
1 if v(a) ∈ D
0 else (12)
S A(o) =
∑
a∈o S A(a)
|o ∩ (Ar ∪ Ao)| (13)
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Timeliness In the context of CTI, time ascends to one of the
crucial elements of CTI quality. As stated earlier, outdated
intelligence is identified throughout the relevant literature as
one of the core challenges [3,5,13]. It is quite evident that the
most current and up-to-date CTI artifacts probably implicate
the most value for any type of analysis.
Time-based information contained within CTI data builds
the basis for the configuration of a timeliness metric appli-
cable to the CTI context. In general, various metrics can be
utilized to assess timeliness. Considering the STIX data for-
mat, a basic timeliness metric is described in Eq. 14. The
two components of this metric—currency and volatility—are
present in every STIX object or can be derived from inher-
ent features of the CTI platform. Volatility in this setting is
expressed by the number of modifications to the assessed
STIX object. The number of modifications can be drawn if
concepts like the historization from earlier work are imple-
mented [29]. This concept allows to track changes and the
number of changes applied to a STIX object. Currency is
referring to the age of the information and thus the time
since its last modification. However, this metric entails cer-
tain problems specifically with regard to interpretability as
well as to other requirements [30].
Where statistical data about the decline of timeliness for
specific CTI information does exist, the metric for timeliness
must be adapted. Resulting values of a statistical timeliness
metric shown in Eq. 15 can subsequently be interpreted as
probability of up-to-date CTI information. Considering the
example in Sect. 3.2, the decline for certain STIX objects is
higher than for others. File hashes as in the Indicator of List-
ing 1 will likely have high decline values as, for example,
malware binaries might undergo slight changes frequently
leading to changed hash values. In contrast, information
regarding the threat actor might not change in time, thus
having no statistical decline at all.
In contrast to these metrics, specific assessment of STIX-
based CTI for the DQ dimension of timeliness can also
be based on characteristics of STIX objects. For example,
Sighting objects can provide information about the time of
occurrence of referenced STIX objects. It can be thus inferred
that for the timeliness of referenced STIX objects, the concept
of inheritance applies. STIX objects of type Observed Data
can be assessed for timeliness following the same procedure.
Our proposed metric described in Eq. 16 includes the current
time, the time of last occurrence, and a predefined time-based
threshold value to foster the applicability of timeliness to any
given CTI use case. In general, we focus on objective metrics
of timeliness. Subjective perceptions such as expert knowl-
edge about threshold values assist the assessment and can be
considered further during implementation. Referring back to
the motivational example, the hospital’s security analysts can
define a threshold based on their experience that indicators
are outdated after a specific amount of time.
T IBasic(o) = 1
(Currency(o) × V olatili t y(o)) + 1
(14)
T IStatistical(o) = exp (−Decline(o) × Currency(o))
(15)
T IAssisted(o) =
{
1 if tcurrent − tlast < threshold
0 else (16)
5.2 Object level
On the object level, we consider two dimensions which rely
on manual input and are therefore defined to be subjective
dimensions. They center on object characteristics of a higher
abstraction level and often follow a cross-object perspective.
Representational consistency In general, the assessment of
representational consistency relies on a set of rules C and
semantic conditions c j contained therein for the underlying
data [24]. This DQ dimension needs to be adjusted to the
requirements of the individual context and the given use case.
Analogous to schema completeness, representational con-
sistency goes beyond aspects of syntactic accuracy. For the
context of threat intelligence, representational consistency
allows for the enforcement of additional formal requirements
which are not addressed by the dimensions of syntactic accu-
racy or concise representation. These might originate from
data format requirements or requirements imposed by a CTI
sharing platform. In the following, we propose two exem-
plary conditions configured to the STIX data format. CTI
platforms could define further conditions or adjust exist-
ing ones. This is part of an iterative approach to support an
increasingly detailed assessment of representational consis-
tency.
In the context of STIX-based threat intelligence, we sug-
gest a first condition to represent the necessity of existence of
referenced STIX objects. For all STIX objects, the following
“inter-relation constraint” [16] applies: referenced objects of
embedded relationships must exist. Moreover, considering
individual STIX objects specific relationships must be veri-
fied. This applies for all SROs as they connect per definition
two SDOs. A second exemplary condition takes time-based
information and the chronological order of creation and mod-
ification of CTI into account. Hence, it must be verified on the
“intra-relation constraint” level that the creation time of any
object is prior or equal to the time of modification. Besides,
SROs can connect two SDOs only after their creation. Cre-
ation time of the corresponding SDOs must be prior or equal
to creation time of the SRO. Listing 1 reveals those two exem-
plary conditions for representational consistency, too. For the
Vulnerability, modification time precedes creation time by a
month. With regard to referenced objects, a Relationship (i.e.,
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“relationship–3”) points toward a nonexistent Vulnerability
(i.e., “vulnerability–2”).
The assessment of representational consistency on a con-
dition basis is described in Eq. 17. A given STIX object is
assessed for each defined condition c j ∈ C separately, and
the results indicate if a condition is fulfilled. Representa-
tional consistency per object is aggregated over all defined
conditions in the set of conditions C as seen in Eq. 18.
Please note that although the assessment of an object o
regarding a condition c j can be automated and therefore is
objective, the definition of the respective conditions is fully
in control of the responsible stakeholder. Thus, we interpret
this dimension to rather be subjective than objective with
respect to the definitions in Sect. 4.1.
c j (o) =
{
1 if o fulfills condition c j
0 else (17)
RC(o) =
|C|∏
j=1
c j (o) (18)
Reputation It is important to build trust in shared CTI envi-
ronments. Trust and the assessment of trustworthiness can
build upon the DQ dimensions of reputation, provenance, and
believability. The introduction of two quality sub-dimensions
for reputation—reputation of the publisher (i.e., provenance)
and reputation of the data set (i.e., believability)—allows for a
holistic coverage of the trustworthiness concept in the context
of CTI exchange. Our proposed assessment is based on func-
tionalities similar to reputation systems and external human
input. Reputation scores for a given publisher p might adhere
to a five-star rating system as shown in Eq. 19 as well as rep-
utation scores of a STIX object o as shown in Eq. 20. Based
on these reputation scores s contained in a set of scores S, an
overall reputation RS(x) for either publisher or STIX object
is calculated according to a simple ratio function described
in Eq. 21. Sample size |S| supports data quality assessment
further and constitutes a relevant additional data point. In the
situational example, the hospital can articulate trust toward
the power plant and its CTI by rating them accordingly.
While the above-mentioned configuration of reputation
is purely subjective, possibilities exist to assist the quality
assessment with objective metrics. For one, a list of trusted
CTI publishers can be introduced as an indicator for the
reputation of a publisher. An analogous indication for the
reputation of an object is the number of access requests to a
certain artifact set in relation to the number of CTI platform
consumers having taken remediating steps upon the threat
intelligence.
RS(p) = {s | 1 ≤ s ≤ 5 ∧ s ∈ N} (19)
RS(o) = {s | 1 ≤ s ≤ 5 ∧ s ∈ N} (20)
RS(x) =
∑
s∈S si
|S| (21)
5.3 Report level
On the upmost level of Fig. 3, we place a single dimension
which takes a complete STIX report including its contained
SDOs and SROs into consideration.
Appropriate amount of data The requirement to include the
appropriate amount of data quality dimension arose during
our discussions with domain experts as described earlier.
However, the application of a generic metric proves not fea-
sible due to its semantic component in the form of needed
data units. We therefore base our metric on the additional
comments of security analysts. Homogeneous SDO types
and very few relationships seemingly lead to the experts’
perception that the report in general is not very helpful.
To distinguish between a report with homogeneous STIX
objects and one with rather diverse objects is a matter of
implementation and cannot easily be compressed into a met-
ric. As described above, this is a rather complex task which
needs further research efforts. As a first approach toward a
feasible support of security experts, we propose a clear rep-
resentation of occurrences of each STIX object in an artifact.
This is achieved by simply counting the instances of the dif-
ferent SDO types within a report. Visualization can provide
this relevant information at the report level and can aid DQ
assessment at first glance.
Besides this, we take graph theory for the connectedness of
the STIX report’s SDOs into account. We argue that a metric
based on the number of relationships can provide a basic indi-
cator to assess this DQ dimension. In general, the metric for
the DQ dimension of appropriate amount of data should yield
a higher score for CTI which is densely connected. A given
STIX report depicts a graph, and its contained SDOs rep-
resent vertices. SDOs are furthermore connected with each
other through SROs which resemble edges from a graph per-
spective. The metric in Eq. 22 sets the number of existing
SROs in a given STIX report in relation to the maximum
possible number of SROs as defined by the number of SDOs
for this report.
The metric for the appropriate amount of data is a
challenge for future work. Our simplistic metric could be
improved in different ways. A possible direction is a statisti-
cal comparison of all available reports. Calculating a report’s
score for the diversity of SDOs and the respective relation-
ships as a comparison with a baseline diversity from other
reports might be a feasible direction. However, the prerequi-
site to this approach is a sufficiently high number of reports
included into the baseline.
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AD(r) = |sro ∈ r ||sdo∈r |(|sdo∈r |−1)
2
(22)
5.4 Aggregating quality indicators
The aggregation of DQ dimension scores for CTI has to be
customizable as described earlier in Sect. 4.2. Adjustable
aggregation parameters enable CTI consumers to define the
weight of each of the DQ dimensions D in the procedure
of calculating a quality indication for each STIX object. For
this customizable aggregation, we propose a weighted aver-
age (see Eq. 23), where each dimensional score di ∈ D is
weighted with a parameter wi ∈ N. This parameter wi can
be adjusted by each platform consumer. If no custom value
is provided for a dimension di , the default weight is wi = 1.
To support consumers’ decisions on which report available
on a CTI sharing platform to analyze, we additionally pro-
pose a report quality indicator calculated following Eq. 24.
This score contains the individual DQ object scores DQ(o)
and the additional report-level dimension of the appropriate
amount of data AD(r). Only the additional DQ dimension’s
score is weighted in this aggregation with w ∈ N. The default
value for w is again 1. Following this aggregation structure,
the weight of each DQ dimension is adjustable by the plat-
form users consuming the respective CTI to ensure that the
quality scores represent their individual preference of the
dimension’s importance.
DQ(o) =
∑
d∈D di · wi∑
d∈D wi
(23)
DQ(r) = (
∑
o∈r DQ(o)) + AD(r) · w
|r | + w (24)
6 Visualizing quality of CTI
Informing users of CTI about the quality of the intelligence at
hand is of crucial importance. This is a vital task in the context
of a sharing platform as it allows users to build trust toward
the shared CTI. We argue that it is not enough to only inform
users about the result of a CTI quality assessment. Instead,
the assessment process itself must be transparent for security
analysts. Thus, a visual interface should inform them “Why”
a report has a specific quality score. As different aspects of
CTI quality might also be of varying importance for users,
the visual interface could also support parametrization of the
quality aggregation as described earlier. Besides the need to
inform users about the CTI quality and building trust, their
subjective perception of a report’s quality is highly relevant
for the assessment process. Therefore, a solution is needed
to allow them to share their opinion.
Providing a possible path to solve these requirements,
we draw upon the idea to make complex threat intelligence
exchange formats, like STIX, accessible for human experts
through an interactive visual interface. The feasibility and
applicability of this approach have been shown in earlier
work [29]. In this work, we implemented and evaluated an
open-source visual analytics prototype for STIX. We extend
this proof of concept by including indicators about the CTI
quality in the interface and by implementing functionali-
ties for experts to share their subjective quality assessment
where necessary. In the following sections, we briefly intro-
duce the changes made to the original visual interface called
Knowledge-Assisted Visual Analytics for STIX (KAVAS).
Additionally, we extend the underlying database (CTI Vault)
to integrate notions of threat intelligence quality. However,
both the database and the visual representation are built to
only handle data compliant to the STIX specification. Thus,
before including CTI quality into the tool, a solution to rep-
resent CTI’s quality in the STIX format is needed.
6.1 Integrating quality indicators into STIX
In its current specification, the STIX format has no object
types or properties to model indications about the quality
of CTI. However, the specification defines the format in a
way which allows for the extension of the baseline specifi-
cation [31]. This opens different possible ways to integrate
CTI quality into this format. On the one hand, it is possible to
define completely new types of STIX objects. On the other
hand, additional properties could be added to the existing
SDO and SRO types.
{
‘‘type ’’:‘‘x-quality -indicator ’’,
‘‘id ’’:‘‘x-quality -indicator --1’’,
‘‘created ’’:‘‘2019-07-25T09 :00:00Z’’,
‘‘modified ’’:‘‘2019-07-25T09 :00:00Z
’’,
‘‘object_ref ’’:‘‘threat -actor --1’’,
‘‘measures ’’: [
{
‘‘dimension ’’:‘‘Syntactic
Accuracy ’’,
‘‘type ’’:‘‘objective ’’,
‘‘score ’ ’:0.8
},
...
{
‘‘dimension ’’:‘‘Reputation ’’,
‘‘type ’’:‘‘subjective ’’,
‘‘score ’’:0.7,
‘‘rating_count ’’:14}
}
]
}
Listing 2 Exemplary Quality Indicator object
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Table 1 Definition of the Measure custom data type for STIX 2
Property name Type Description
dimension (required) String The dimension for which the measurement is described
type (required) String (“subjective” or “objective”) Describes whether the dimension’s score is based on a subjective or an
objective metric
score (required) Float Double-precision number ranging from 0 to 1 describing the current
result of the quality assessment for a quality dimension
rating_count (optional) Integer This property is only needed for “subjective” measures as it describes
how many different ratings were given to produce the current score
Table 2 Definition of the Quality Indicator custom object for STIX 2
Common properties
type, id, created_by_ref, created, modified, revoked, labels, external_references, object_marking_refs, granular_markings
Quality indicator specific properties
object_ref, measures
Property Name Type Description
type (required) string The value of this property MUST be “x-quality-indicator”
object_ref (required) identifier Specifies the STIX Object that is referred to by this quality indicator
measures (required) list of type measure A list holding all measurements for the different quality dimensions available
for the referred-to STIX Object
In any case for each STIX object, the calculated scores
for the different quality dimensions need to be documented.
To capture the necessary information in a STIX-conformant
way, we therefore propose the custom data type Measure
defined in Table 1. This data type consists of the name of
a specific dimension and the object’s respective score. It
is worth noting that our proposal centers on float values.
Nevertheless, scores on an ordinal scale are also possible.
Respective conversions can be implemented by defining
ranges of float values which refer to a specific ordinal scale
(low, medium, and high). Additionally, the custom data type
contains the type (subjective or objective) of the dimension.
For subjective dimensions, the count of received ratings used
to calculate the score can be stored.
We opt to attach a list of measures structured according
to the proposed Measure data type to a new Custom STIX
object. While it is also possible to include this list in any
existing STIX object, our proposal aims to maintain a clear
separation between actual threat information and the related
quality information. Additionally, this proposal produces as
less interference as possible with the existing data model.
Neither the existing SDOs nor SROs need to be changed. In
compliance with the specification, we follow the mechanisms
and requirements given to introduce custom objects called
Quality Indicator. Besides the mandatory Common Proper-
ties, a number of specific properties are established [31].
Table 2 defines the proposed STIX Custom Object. We
include common properties of our Quality Indicator object
which are mandatory for each SDO. These properties are fol-
lowed by several specific properties defined for the object.
The last part of Table 2 defines allowed data types and
values for the specific Quality Indicator properties. The
type attribute must not hold other values than “x-quality-
indicator”. The Quality Indicator object is not connected to
any other objects with an explicit SRO but holds a property
“object_ref” reflecting the ID of the SDO or SRO for which
the object indicates the relevant quality measures. Finally, the
object contains a list of “measures” which holds the scores
for all the DQ dimensions. The list is formed of the custom
Measure data type. An exemplary and simplified object is
shown in Listing 2.
STIX is an actively maintained CTI standard. Recently,
there have been developments that incorporate some aspects
similar to our CTI quality concept within the newest STIX2.1
Committee Specification Draft.5 Most notably, this draft
includes an Opinion SDO to capture perceptions by CTI
consumers about the correctness of a STIX object. The Opin-
ion SDO aims to document the level of agreement with the
referred-to STIX object(s) on a Likert-type scale ranging
from strongly disagree to strongly agree. As can be seen by
the purpose and the description of the Opinion SDO, this spe-
5 https://docs.oasis-open.org/cti/stix/v2.1/stix-v2.1.html.
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cific STIX object is another prospective option to implement
elements of the Reputation data quality dimension. Never-
theless, in contrast to our proposed Quality Indicator SDO
the draft and its Opinion SDO fall short to cover a larger CTI
quality concept.
6.2 Persisting quality indicators in the CTI Vault
The original database for the CTI visualization is a graph-
based approach based on Neo4J.6 This is quite reasonable
as STIX is based in graph-like structure itself. Additionally,
the integrity-preserving storage concept proposed by Böhm
et al. [29] is most efficiently implemented using this tech-
nology. We extend this approach by adding a new database
to the architecture. This new database is solely supposed to
persist the Quality Indicator objects introduced in Sect. 6.1.
As described, these objects do not have any explicit connec-
tions to other STIX objects via SROs. Their integration would
double the number of objects inside the existing database and
would certainly affect the performance negatively. Therefore,
we decided to avoid storing the quality object inside the exist-
ing vault.
Our newly added “Quality Vault” is a document-oriented
database (MongoDB7) for performance reasons. This addi-
tional vault persists the JSON representations of the Quality
Indicator objects which are directly related to a single SDO
or SRO in the CTI Vault via the “object_ref” attribute.
6.3 Displaying quality indicators in KAVAS
Throughout this section, we describe the changes we made
to the original visual interface to include visual indications
about the quality of STIX artifacts. In Böhm et al. [29], the
process of visually analyzing STIX-based CTI with KAVAS
starts with a simple drop-down menu to select the report
of interest. The drop-down menu contains only the name
of the report given by its publisher. This does not disclose
any additional information to the analyst whether the report
might be of interest or not. We changed this initial view of
the KAVAS interface to be more informative and also to give
first insight into the quality of the report. The visual interface
now contains an expandable list of all available reports from
the CTI Vault. The expansion panel for each STIX report
consists of three main sections depicted in Fig. 4 informing
analysts on the contents and overall quality of a STIX artifact
at first glance8:
6 https://neo4j.com/.
7 https://www.mongodb.com/.
8 Please note that the displayed information is computed based on a
test data set which is different from the STIX example in Sect. 3.2.
1. At first, a description (if given by the report’s producer)
gives high-level information on what the report is about.
2. The second section shows which specific STIX objects,
both SDOs and SROs, are contained in the report and how
often they are present. Object types that are not present
in the respective STIX artifact are grayed out. This view
fulfills the requirement to provide a view on the homo-
geneity of a STIX artifact as described in Sect. 5.3 within
the quality dimension of Appropriate amount of data.
3. The third section gives a very brief and high-level indica-
tion on the average quality of the STIX objects and their
interconnectedness within the respective report using two
gauge displays. This connectedness is represented by the
score as described in Sect. 5.3.
After a STIX report is selected and its graph representa-
tion is loaded in the visual interface further changes become
apparent, clicking a node or a link of the graph details its
information in a details-on-demand card view. The original
object card only contained a tab with the attribute values
of the selected object and, for SDOs, a tab with its directly
linked neighbors in the graph. We now add a quality badge
in the header of the object card displaying the aggregated
quality score of the dimensions from object and attribute
level as described in Sect. 5.4. Furthermore, we add a new
tab providing more detailed insight and transparency of the
quality measuring. The new object quality tab on the details-
on-demand view is shown in Fig. 5. Again, this component
is divided into three sections:
1. A gauge visualization of the object’s overall quality score
aggregated from the scores at the attribute and object
level.
2. A section with progress bars indicating the object’s score
for all described objective dimensions.
3. A third section that holds the indicators for an object’s
scores of subjective quality dimensions. For this part of
the quality tab, we need to both inform the user about
the current score and allow them to provide their own
subjective quality measurement for the respective dimen-
sions. To do so, we lend from reputation systems and
display a rating bar ranging from one to five stars which
is a well-known visual metaphor in reputation systems.
These rating bars always show the current overall score
for the quality dimension (blue stars) in relation to the
possible highest rating while also allowing users to click
each of the stars to provide their own rating. Numbers in
parentheses besides the name of the DQ dimension indi-
cate the count of ratings provided by other users (e.g., the
number of subjective assessments on which the current
score is based).
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Fig. 4 View of report selection screen
Fig. 5 Quality tab on object card (details-on-demand)
The quality tab fulfills a twofold goal: First, it makes the
aggregation of the quality dimensions transparent, and sec-
ond, it allows collecting user’s input for subjective quality
dimensions. We actively decided not to use any color-coding
for the scores. Traditionally, respective scores are colored
with red (low quality), orange (medium quality), and green
(high quality). However, we only aim to inform CTI ana-
lysts about the quality scores and do not want to provide any
kind of interpretation of low or high score for any quality
dimensions. As described earlier, this is mainly because the
quality dimensions might be of different interest for different
consumers. Therefore, low scores for respective dimensions
of an object do not automatically implicate that the object is
irrelevant or of low overall quality for the consumer.
In order to allow users to customize the aggregation of
quality dimension scores following our previously described
bottom-up approach, analysts need a way to define the dimen-
sions’ weights. To provide this functionality, we extend the
KAVAS settings dialog with a slider for each quality dimen-
sion as depicted in Fig. 6. The default configuration assumes
that all dimensions are equally important (e.g., have a weight
of 1). Analysts can use the sliders to customize the dimen-
sion aggregation according to their preference. If they do not
want a specific dimension to have any influence in the aggre-
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Fig. 6 Slider for dimension weights
gation, they can assign a weight of 0 and for a dimension with
crucial importance, they can accordingly assign a weight of
5. Please note that the metric for dimension aggregation in
Eq. 23 does not limit the range for the dimension’s weight.
However, we chose to limit them in the visual interface to a
range from 0 to 5 for more practical feasibility.
6.4 Evaluating the visual display of CTI quality
To validate the visualization approach and to provide first
evidence of its suitability, we conduct a number of expert
interviews. The main goal of these interviews is to validate
that the visual approach helps analysts to understand the DQ
of the CTI artifact at hand.
Participants The interviewees are three security experts
from different sectors and company sizes. We conduct inter-
views with two highly experienced security analysts from
a big international conglomerate and a medium-sized man-
ufacturing company. The third interviewee is a researcher
focusing on CTI sharing formats. Each participant has a
medium to high knowledge regarding threat intelligence as
all of them deal with information security on a daily basis.
None of the participants currently obtains a quality assess-
ment on CTI.
Design and procedure The interviews with the experts are
designed following a semi-structured approach and are split-
ted into the following four phases [32]:
1. Introduction Starting the interviews, each participant is
questioned for some basic data, their experience, such
as knowledge on CTI and DQ aspects. Afterward, each
expert is introduced briefly to the STIX format (if nec-
essary) and to the problem of measuring CTI quality.
Thereby, the experts are actively asked to criticize any
potential issues noticed throughout the following inter-
view phases.
2. Measuring CTI quality In this phase, we aim to get addi-
tional feedback on the individual dimensions and the
configured metrics for quality assessment of STIX arti-
facts (Sects. 4 and 5). Although the dimensions and
the metrics are already the result of an iterative process
where we collaborated with researchers and practition-
ers, an additional evaluation of these results is performed
in this phase. The selected dimensions, their structure,
and the configured metrics are discussed with the inter-
viewees to identify whether they support the relevance
of the proposed DQ measurement approach. We also ask
the participants what aspects of the dimensions and met-
rics might need a more detailed explanation and whether
they think that the metrics are comprehensible for secu-
rity analysts without much prior knowledge in the DQ
area.
3. Visualizing CTI quality The focus of this phase is to test
the suitability of the proposed visualization approach. To
enable the interviewees to work with the DQ visualiza-
tion, we make use of sample STIX reports provided by the
OASIS consortium. Prior to the interviews, these reports
were manually fed into the existing KAVAS tool and
enriched with the DQ measures. During the interviews,
the participants can access the STIX reports through the
extended KAVAS tool as described in Sect. 6. The main
goal in this interview phase is to identify whether the
proposed visualization elements to display the CTI qual-
ity are actually helpful for security analysts. We ask the
interviewees whether the proposed DQ metrics are com-
prehensible with the chosen visualization elements and
what further aspects they think would enhance the under-
standing of DQ assessment within CTI.
4. Wrap-Up The last phase of the interviews is dedicated
to a summarizing discussion. Here, we discuss with the
participants whether an implementation of the proposed
metrics and the respective visualization approach would
be applicable to operative deployment and the conditions
thereto. Finally, we collect a list of ideas and features the
interviewees find useful for improving our approach.
Results The interviews lasted between 45 to 75 minutes.
The results of the conducted interviews are presented in the
following, divided according to the four interview phases
described before:
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Table 3 General information on the interview participants
Position Business branch Organization’s size CTI knowledge DQ knowledge
#1 Senior security analyst Manufacturing ca. 400.000 High Medium
#2 Head of security information management Manufacturing ca. 15.000 Low Medium
#3 Security researcher Academia ca. 5.000 High Medium
1. Introduction The results of the introduction phase are
summarized in Table 3 giving an overview on general
information about the interviewees.
2. Measuring CTI quality Above all, the interviewees unan-
imously stress the importance of metrics for quality
within the field of CTI. Valuable and actionable CTI is
stated to be highly dependent on quality and currently
more often than not CTI is of low quality. A recurring
theme mentioned in this phase by multiple interviewees
is the interpretation of CTI quality. It is pointed out
that the implementation of metrics for CTI quality by
sharing platforms would benefit significantly from indi-
cation of low- and high- quality reference scores. Another
identified theme is usability of DQ dimensions and met-
rics for CTI. Here, formally sound metrics, the chosen
naming convention of DQ dimensions based on exist-
ing academic work and security analysts without DQ
or mathematical background, stand opposite each other.
Comprehensive explanations are seen as one approach
to foster security analysts’ understanding of the precise
meaning of CTI quality dimensions and metrics.
3. Visualizing CTI quality All interviewees agree on the
necessity to provide easy access to CTI quality through
the use of visualization elements and validate our visual-
ization approach. All interviewees agreed that the chosen
visual representation allows for a quick recognition of
CTI quality. They also uniformly considered the pos-
sibility to include subjective perceptions with means
similar to reputation systems very helpful. Nevertheless,
the interviewees name different extensions to the current
visualization. For one, in-depth information about the
DQ dimensions, the metrics, and possible interpretation
is highlighted. Additionally, the showcased visualization
includes percentages numbers and numeric weighting
factors which could instead be visualized on a Likert-
type scale. Another proposed extension targets the causal
nature of low-quality scores. Visualization elements to
detect improvements and eventually improve the CTI
quality further are perceived as helpful. As one intervie-
wee points out, user groups (e.g., system administrator
or standard user) could be defined, given different per-
missions and thus see different visualizations.
4. Wrap-up In the final phase, the interviewees often come
back to the timeliness dimension. The proposed metrics
for this DQ dimension needed additional explanations
with regard to STIX specifics (i.e., Sighting SDO). Ideas
and features mentioned by the interviewees to extend our
work cover guidance to improve CTI quality and quality
filtering with visualization elements. For instance, visual
recommendations to reach a higher CTI quality (with or
without prior knowledge about quality details) might be
added to the current reactive assessment.
Overall, the interviewees’ feedback indicates the valuable
contribution of measuring and visualizing CTI quality. In
particular, the dual approach itself (measure and visualize)
is assumed to reduce complexity, lower quality assessment
barriers, and foster CTI utilization. With regard to the imple-
mentation within a CTI sharing platform, we draw the
conclusions that 1) there needs to be discussion on usability
and adequate naming of DQ dimensions, 2) reference values
are crucial for CTI quality interpretation, and 3) visual ele-
ments and textual explanations must be combined to avoid
ambiguity.
7 Conclusion and future work
This work shed light on the assessment of DQ dimensions
in the context of CTI. Nonetheless, there are further areas
where research needs to be intensified and extended to.
7.1 Conclusion
Recent developments in the cyber threat landscape urge orga-
nizations to join forces against the adversaries. Collaboration
based on the exchange of available threat intelligence arises
as one of their most effective weapons. CTI sharing leveraged
by respective platforms helps to spread knowledge about
current threats. However, respective formats are oftentimes
complex and large leading to a lack of readability for domain
experts. Therefore, it is a vital task to help experts understand
the CTI, for example, by providing visual representations.
CTI can only be effective when security experts are able to
comprehend it quickly and efficiently. Another issue hinder-
ing the effectiveness of CTI is the missing quality control
on sharing platforms. This lack of DQ management mostly
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stems from missing proposals to measure CTI quality in the
first place.
Our studies cumulated within this work constitute a nec-
essary first step into this direction. This includes the two
focal points of measurement and visualization of threat intel-
ligence quality. Existing academic work proposed sets of
possibly relevant quality dimensions as well as high-level
requirements for CTI quality assessment. Although calling
for an inclusion of quality assessment and assurance into
the world of CTI sharing, up to now there are no propos-
als for actual quality metrics applicable to CTI. Therefore,
proposing a relevant set of quality dimensions and configur-
ing respective metrics for a specific CTI format is a necessary
step toward actionable CTI quality assessment. The proposed
dimensions and metrics can help to build a cohesive quality
management methodology for CTI based on the STIX data
format. Most of our findings regarding suitable as well as not
applicable DQ dimensions or metrics can also be applied to
other CTI formats. It is possible to think of additional, more
specific dimensions which could be defined to assess qual-
ity of threat intelligence. However, in this work we define
a base set of dimensions that originate from existing and
widely agreed-upon DQ dimensions. This base set can eas-
ily be extended, and detailed metrics can complement our
proposed ones if necessary.
Besides the definition of metrics to measure CTI’s qual-
ity for relevant dimensions, we also showed how this quality
assessment can be made transparent to users of a sharing
platform. Transparency herein supports both building trust
for the available information and making informed decisions
about which CTI artifact is worth analyzing. This is important
as current sharing platforms already hold an unmanageable
amount of threat intelligence. Informing potential consumers
of an artifact about its quality is a helpful decision support
for the consumer. The visual display of an object’s overall
quality including the respective scores for individual qual-
ity dimensions helps consumers to understand how the DQ
measurement result was reached. Additionally, it provides
a way to collect important input from users for subjective
quality dimensions. We therefore also show how human CTI
analysts can be included into the quality assessment.
7.2 Future work
Our work can be seen as a first step into the direction of mea-
suring CTI quality. However, we can identify several topics
demanding additional research effort.
We are among the first to propose a cohesive set of appli-
cable CTI quality dimensions. Therefore, these dimensions
might be subjected to changes as more knowledge is gained
about CTI sharing processes, platforms, and associated stake-
holders. One dimension which needs further attention is the
Appropriate amount of data. The proposed metric is a first
approach toward a highly complex issue. It is difficult to
define which amount of data—either data regarding STIX
objects or the information described by these objects—is
appropriate. Thus, we propose a simple metric to give domain
experts an indication of the data contained in a STIX report.
The DQ metric for the appropriate amount of data should
be further detailed upon analysis and verification with CTI
platform data. Furthermore, the metrics to evaluate quality
should be reconfigured for other CTI formats and integrated
into a cohesive data quality management methodology for
CTI.
After formally configuring the metrics for the selected
quality dimensions, those metrics should be implemented
into an actual sharing platform. Up to now, we only tested
them in a small scaled environment. A complete implemen-
tation will likely raise further issues about the selection of
suitable algorithms and the control of user participation and
intentions which go beyond the core DQ assessment and
have not been addressed in this work. Warranted through
an implementation, the extension of some proposed dimen-
sions can become feasible as more information about the
requirements will be available. Implementing and extend-
ing the dimensions and metrics are necessary steps to finally
build a cohesive methodology for quality assessment of CTI
including processes to assure and improve quality of artifacts
on a sharing platform.
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